Strong on Form, Short on Returns

Low-return SGX companies score higher on governance than those earning their cost of equity, yet trade at 0.57x book. Why new governance rules won’t fix that. Originally published in The Edge Singapore on 16 November 2027. Full text below.

Lee Ooi Keong

11/20/202611 min read

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Strong on Form, Short on Returns

Singapore’s low-return companies have higher governance scores than those that earn their cost of equity. Investors still value them at just over half their book value. The proposed rules will lift governance standards, but not returns. Two numbers in every annual report would do more.

Some of Singapore’s companies with the best governance scores are among its weakest earners. In the Singapore Governance and Transparency Index (SGTI), which rates listed companies each year against the Code of Corporate Governance, profitable companies earning less than 8% on their equity have a median governance score of 74.1. Companies earning 8% or more have 71.5. So the group with the higher governance scores earns less, and investors pay less for it: 0.57 times book value, against 1.62 times for the group with lower governance scores and higher returns.

That gap is the test for the 21 recommendations the Corporate Governance Advisory Committee (CGAC) and SGX RegCo put out for consultation on 27 October, with comments due by 27 January 2027. Most are modest. They adjust the rules on director independence, pay disclosure and risk reporting, and move a few provisions from the Code into the SGX Listing Rules.

The Code promises that companies embracing good governance "are more likely to engender investor confidence and achieve long-term sustainable business performance". CGAC chairman Bob Tan said the new proposals "aim to elevate standards and build greater trust between listed issuers and investors".

The evidence says investors are pricing something else. In October 2026, 69.3% of the 446 SGTI companies with market data had a return on equity (ROE) below their cost of equity (COE), which for Singapore companies is about 8%. For them, the Code’s promise has not held. That is not because governance does not matter. Governance and returns do different jobs, and these proposals address only one of them.

What will bind, and what will not

The proposals use two kinds of rule. The Listing Rules are mandatory, and SGX RegCo enforces them. The Code works on comply-or-explain: a company may depart from any provision if it explains why.

Four proposals go into the Listing Rules. A company whose chairman is not independent must appoint a lead independent director. The audit, nominating and remuneration committees must each have an independent chairman and an independent majority. Announcements of new directors must give the reasons for the choice, and annual reports must say whether directors took part in professional development. The consultation leaves open whether the five-seat cap and a capital management policy go into the Rules or the Code. Everything else goes into the Code or its Practice Guidance.

The board Rules will leave most listed companies’ boards exactly as they are. Even the Rule that reaches furthest leaves 88.6% of them untouched (see Table 1). SGX’s own figures show that more than 95% of companies already have an independent chairman on each of the three committees, and at least 98.5% an independent majority. The lead independent director Rule reaches only the 11.4% of listed entities whose chairman was not independent and who had no lead independent director. The five-seat cap, if made a Rule, would reach at least 8.1% of companies: those with a director holding more than five SGX seats. Because the cap also counts overseas boards, it would reach more.

In October 2026, 72% of SGX’s 604 listed companies had an ROE below 8%, made a loss or were suspended (see Chart 1). Nothing in the proposals asks any of them to report their ROE against their COE. The draft guidance mentions ROE only as an example: among the criteria a board may use to judge itself against industry peers, and among the measures pay may be linked to. The rest is comply-or-explain. Conscientious companies will apply it in full. Laggards will answer with boilerplate, and SGX RegCo chief executive Tan Boon Gin expects as much. "A boilerplate disclosure is better than no disclosure at all," he told reporters. "The one with a boilerplate will be left behind."

Governance protects what a company earns

Singapore's Code defines governance as "having the appropriate people, processes and structures to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company to enhance long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders".

Aswath Damodaran, Professor of Finance at New York University's Stern School of Business, sees it differently. He defines governance as a measure of the power shareholders have to change the way a business is run. Research and practice, he argues, have lost sight of this, and fixed instead on details such as the number of board members, their tenure and the mix of insiders and outsiders. Governance scores, he warns, "have been gamed by companies, making them poor indicators of shareholder power".

That power is what institutional investors look for. A fund that buys into a controlled company needs to know that the company will be run in the interests of all its shareholders, minorities included, and that it can act if the board falls short. A 2013 Harvard study of US companies found that those with rules making it hard for shareholders to remove the management, such as defences against takeovers, went on trading at lower values. Governance of this kind protects what a company earns.

In Singapore, minority shareholders have little of that power. In 70.8% of SGX-listed companies, at least one executive director is a substantial shareholder or related to one, according to the NUS Centre for Investor Protection. In a controlled company, the controlling shareholder decides who sits on the board as a director, independent or not. The proposals give independent directors new roles, as lead independent director and committee chairmen. They leave unchanged who chooses them.

None of this is an argument against better governance. Singapore needs it. Good governance protects minority shareholders, holds management to account and gives investors a way to act when a board falls short. Governance decides whether all shareholders get their fair share of what a company earns. Returns decide how much there is to share. Neither replaces the other, and each needs its own measure.

What the SGTI shows

The SGTI is run by the NUS Business School's Centre for Governance and Sustainability, CPA Australia and the Singapore Institute of Directors. It rates companies on their governance and disclosure, out of a possible 143 points. The median score of the 458 companies in the 2026 edition was 69.7.

The first finding is that valuations follow returns, not governance scores (see Chart 2). Price-to-book compares a company’s share price with its net assets per share. It is the simplest way to see how much confidence investors have in a company. Among the 268 profitable SGTI companies with a price-to-book figure, the median rises steadily with ROE, from 0.49 times for companies earning under 4% to 2.17 times for those earning 20% or more. Against governance scores it shows no pattern. The correlation between governance score and price-to-book is 0.05, where 1 would be a perfect match and 0 none at all. For ROE and price-to-book, it is 0.65.

The one exception is the 26 profitable companies with governance scores of 90 or more, which trade at 1.48 times book. Most are large blue chips: 13 are STI constituents, and their median market value is S$6.8 billion. Size, not governance score, explains their price. Among the 81 profitable companies worth more than S$500 million, the correlation between governance score and price-to-book is -0.11, against 0.76 for ROE. Nor does size explain the premium for returns. At every size, companies earning 8% or more trade at 2.2 to 3.0 times the price-to-book of those earning less (see Table 2).

The second finding explains why governance scores do not move valuations. Governance scores rise with company size, not with returns (see Chart 3). Among profitable companies, the correlation between governance score and market value is 0.53; between governance score and ROE, it is -0.06. The median score rises from 67.3 for companies worth under S$100 million to 74.0 for those worth S$100 million to S$500 million, and 80.3 for those above. Large companies have the staff and budgets to meet every disclosure the index checks, and the SGTI’s own organisers report the same size effect. Within each size band, companies earning under 8% score as high as, or higher than, those earning more.

The governance score measures how fully a company follows and reports the Code. It does not measure what the company earns. The SGTI’s organisers proposed adding financial and share-price measures, worth up to 25% of the score, from 2026. In August they deferred the change until the current reviews are complete. There is a good case for keeping the two apart. Mixed into one number, the score would tell investors less about either.

Will the new rules lift valuations by lifting governance scores? There is little reason to expect it. The new Rules mostly codify what companies already do, so governance scores will barely move. Governance scores are also stable: the index average was 70.9 in 2025 and 69.5 in 2026. If high governance scores drew investors in, the low-return companies with high scores would by now trade at a premium. They trade at 0.57 times book.

Why the price follows the return

A standard valuation formula shows why. Price-to-book can also be written as:

Price-to-book = (ROE - g) / (COE - g)

where g is the company’s long-run growth rate.

It leads to three conclusions.

  1. Price-to-book rises with ROE. A company with an ROE of 16%, a COE of 8% and growth of 2% a year is worth (16 - 2) / (8 - 2), or 2.3 times book. Chart 2 shows the market pricing much this way: companies earning 16% to 20% trade at a median 2.13 times. In my article ‘What Investors Actually Pay For’ (The Edge Singapore, 2 November), ROE alone explained 19.2 percentage points of the differences in price-to-book across SGX companies, more than company size and sector together at 16.1 points.

  2. When ROE is below COE, growth destroys shareholder value. The median low-return company has an ROE of 3.5%. The formula values it at 0.44 times book if it stands still, and 0.25 times book if it grows 2% a year, because each dollar it reinvests at its current returns earns 3.5% when its shareholders could earn 8% elsewhere. A board that approves expansion in a business earning below its COE is making its shareholders poorer. The same arithmetic explains why low returns are so hard to escape. In ‘Stuck: Why Poor Returns Stay Poor’ (The Edge Singapore, 7 September), I tracked the SGX companies that earned below 8% in January 2025. Of those that grew revenue and lifted margins, 31.1% had risen above 8% within 18 months. Of those that grew revenue while margins fell, 6.6% had.

  3. Governance appears nowhere in the formula. At most it enters indirectly, through COE, if investors accept a lower return from better-governed companies. The SGTI evidence suggests Singapore investors make no such allowance. The market pays 0.57 times book for low-return companies, more than the formula’s 0.25, which may reflect asset values or hopes of better returns. They are not paying for the governance score.

Who will read the new disclosures

Disclosure moves a share price only when investors read it and trade on it. Most low-return companies have too few such investors. In the 90 trading days to 16 October, the median profitable company with an ROE below 8% traded S$30,460 of shares a day, and the median loss-maker S$3,490. A fund buying no more than a fifth of each day’s trading would need about eight months to build a S$1 million holding in such a company. In the median loss-maker, it would need nearly six years.

Tan Boon Gin's warning has already come true for most of these companies. They were left behind long before any new disclosure was written, and better disclosure will not bring investors to shares this thinly traded.

What follows

The proposals will raise governance standards, and Singapore should welcome that. But they will not close its valuation discount, because the discount comes from a lack of returns. Returns are earned by management. Boards shape them through the targets and pay they set, and by deciding whether profits are reinvested or returned to shareholders.

No rule can order a higher return. Of the 394 SGX companies with an ROE below 8% in January 2025, only 14.5% had risen above it 18 months later. A required plan to raise ROE would draw the same boilerplate as everything else. What changes behaviour is what management is paid to deliver. In a 2026 study of SGX companies by the NUS Centre for Investor Protection, only 35 of the 634 bonus measures that companies disclosed were investor and shareholder return measures, and no company disclosed how much weight each carried. SGX’s Rule 1207(10E) already requires companies to name the measures behind executive pay. The draft Practice Guidance asks them to disclose the weights as well, but Practice Guidance is not binding.

Question 17 asks whether companies should disclose a capital management policy, and whether that should be a Listing Rule or a Code provision. SGX has already drafted the Rule. An amended Rule 710C would require every company to keep such a policy, describe it in its annual report and explain any departure from it. The draft Practice Note 7.9 that goes with it says the policy ‘may’ set out the measures of capital efficiency the board monitors.

That ‘may’ should become ‘must’, and two figures should be named: the company’s ROE for each of the past three years, and the share of the chief executive’s variable pay that depends on ROE or another return on capital. This asks only for disclosure. It sets no target and does not tell any board how to pay its chief executive. A board that ties none of that pay to returns remains free to do so; it reports 0% and explains why. A number cannot be answered with boilerplate, and a board that reports 0% beside an ROE of 3.5% will need a good explanation.

If RegCo prefers to keep the policy in the Code, the same fix applies. Its draft Practice Guidance says the policy ‘could include’ the capital efficiency measures the board monitors. The two figures should be named in the Code provision itself, so that every company must follow or explain. Both are already in the company’s books, and boards need not wait: they can publish them in the dividend policy every company must maintain under Rule 710C from 1 January 2027.

SGX can supply the comparison. It already shows each company's ROE on its website. It can also calculate and show each company’s COE, as Bloomberg does: the yield on Singapore government bonds plus a premium for the risk of owning shares. Most low-return companies trade too thinly for their own share prices to give a reliable measure of that risk, so SGX should use the average for each sector. A board that disagrees with SGX's figure can publish its own, with its reasons. Every company's ROE would then sit beside its COE, in public, every year.

The regulators should also measure whether the proposals work. They cannot set returns for individual companies, and should not try, but they can publish a starting point and report against it each year. Two figures would serve: the share of SGX's 604 listed companies with an ROE of 8% or more, 28.0% in October 2026, and the median price-to-book of all listed companies, 0.82 times. If both rise, the proposals are working. If neither moves, they have added paperwork.

In October 2026, 29.6% of the 446 SGTI companies analysed here were profitable but earned less than 8% on their equity. Their median governance score was 74.1, above the index median of 69.7. Their shares traded at 0.57 times book. Better governance will protect what these companies earn. Only better returns will change what investors pay for them.

Written on November 8, 2026 by Lee Ooi Keong.

Lee Ooi Keong is an Independent Director of an SGX Mainboard-listed company with over 30 years of experience in corporate performance, investments and risk management. He is the founder and Managing Director of Clover Point Consultants, an independent Board and C-suite advisory firm, and was formerly Director of Risk Management at Temasek for over 16 years.

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